Supply Chain Security
Protect the path from source commit to deployed artefact against tampering and dependency compromise.
AdvancedSoftware Supply Chain SecuritySupply Chain
Where it fits in the lifecycle
- Plan
- Code
- Build
- Test
- Release
- Deploy
- Operate
- Monitor
- Build Dependency scanning, image scanning, SBOM generation and signing.
- Release Approval controls, artefact promotion and provenance.
- Deploy Policy enforcement, admission control and infrastructure security.
Overview
Supply chain security treats the build system as production infrastructure: verified source, hermetic and reproducible builds, signed artefacts, recorded provenance, and verification before deployment.
Why it matters
Attacks increasingly target build systems and package registries because one compromise reaches every downstream consumer.
How it works
- 01Source integrity is enforced with protected branches and signed commits.
- 02Builds run on ephemeral, isolated runners with pinned toolchains.
- 03Artefacts are signed and provenance attestations are recorded.
- 04Deployment admission verifies signature and provenance before running the artefact.
Common tools
Sigstore CosignSyftin-totoTrivyGitHubGitLabSLSAKubernetes
Implementation examples
bashSign and verify an image
cosign sign --yes $IMAGE_DIGESTcosign verify --certificate-identity-regexp '.*' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ $IMAGE_DIGESTBest practices
- Pin dependencies and actions by digest.
- Separate build and deploy credentials.
- Verify signatures at admission, not just at build.
Common mistakes
- Signing artefacts but never verifying them.
- Giving pipeline jobs broad, long-lived registry credentials.
Hands-on labs
- Lab 07 — Sign and Verify an Artifact
Generate an SBOM, sign a container image with Cosign, and verify the signature.